“The setting up of the Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI) is a major step in improving governance with regard to delivery of public services. This project is very close to my heart. I am happy to note that this project also marks the beginning of an era where the top private sector talent in India steps forward to take the responsibility for implementing projects of vital national importance.  The UIDAI will set up an online data base with identity and biometric details of Indian residents and provide enrolment and verification services across the country. The first set of unique identity numbers will be rolled out in 12 to 18 months. I have proposed a provision of Rs.120 crore for this project.”

-Para 64, Union Budget Speech 2009-10 by Pranab Mukherjee, as Finance Minister

UIDAI is entrusted with certain roles and responsibilities, which includes defining "mechanisms and processes for interlinking UID with partner data bases on a continuous basis" and ensuring "standardisation of data elements that are collected and digitised and enable collation with UID and its partner databases." Creation of a large and sustainable Aadhaar eco system: UIDAI has advocated a partnership model to leverage the existing infrastructure of Government and other institutions and to promote a model for sustainable development of various eco system partners. It is also admitted that cross verification with other data bases such as Census, Election Commission etc. has been underway disclosed an article entitled Aadhaar and Audit published in the November 2013 issue of Journal of Government Audit and Accounts.

The electoral database is a partner database of the database of the UIDAI's datbase. By now "shifting of the electoral roll database of all States/UTs to the ERONET platform" has been admitted on March 2, 2025. Over 60 crore voters' EPIC Number have been linked with Aadhaar Number although linking is "voluntary" like Aadhaar Number was advertised as "voluntary" and turned into mandatory in clear case of breach of trust.

Aadhaar Act is a mini-Constitution. Some eighteen years after “an online database with identity and biometric details of Indian residents”, UIDAI's Central Identities Data Repository (CIDR) of UID/Aadhaar Numbers project was announced by Pranab Mukherjee as Finance Minister ahead of his visit to Washington D.C. to attend the launch of World Bank’s eTransform Initiative, political parties are yet to realize that CIDR of Aadhaar number is a tool for unlimited and endless electoral ‘surveillance’. It is a Weapon of Mass Destruction for democratic elections. By now it is becoming quite apparent that Pranab Mukherjee, the political father of UIDAI and his collaborators paved the way for the electoral rout of India’s oldest party.

After the publication of the 108-page long audit report on the performance of Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI) by the Comptroller Auditor General (CAG) of India, the credulity of the leaders in the sectors is inexcusable and unpardonable. CAG’s official motto is लोकहितार्थ सत्यनिष्ठा:Dedicated to Truth in Public Interest" but by choosing not pay attention to its findings, the cabinet committee on security, national security advisors, judges, advocates, legislators, owner-editors, soldiers, civil society groups like Association of Democratic Reforms (ADR), Bharat Jodo Abhiyan and political parties including Jan Suraj Party have made themselves complicit. Prima facie they do not appear to be dedicated to Truth in Public Interest.     

A Press Note dated September 7, 2026 issued by Election Commission of India (ECI) announcing bye-elections to 5 Assembly Constituencies of West Bengal, Assam, Tamil Nadu and Puducherry has a paragraph about “Identification of Voters”.  It reads:”3. IDENTIFICATION OF VOTERS: Electoral Photo Identity Card (EPIC) shall be the main document of identification of a voter. However, any of the below mentioned identification documents can also be shown at the polling station:

i. Aadhar Card;

ii. MGNREGA Job Card;

iii. Passbooks with photograph issued by Bank/Post Office;

iv. Health Insurance Smart Card issued under the scheme of Ministry of Labour/Ayushman Bharat Health Card;

v. Driving License;

vi. PAN Card;

vii. Smart Card issued by RGI under NPR;

viii. Indian Passport;

ix. Pension document with photograph;

x. Service Identity Cards with photograph issued to employees

by Central/State Govt./PSUs/Public Limited Companies;

xi. Official identity cards issued to MPs/MLAs/MLCs; and

xii. Unique Disability ID (UDID) Card, M/o Social Justice & Empowerment, Government of India.”

ECI has repeatedly committed the blunder by referring to“Aadhaar number” as  “Aadhar Card”. Under Aadhaar Act, 20126, “Aadhaar number”, an identification number issued to an individual who has resided in India for a period or periods amounting in all to one hundred and eighty-two days or more in the twelve months immediately preceding the date of application for enrolment, as “Aadhar Card”. Its spelling of the brand name of Unique Identity (UID) number is wrong. Its reference to “Card” is contrary to Aadhaar Act because there is no provision of “Card” under it. Out the 12 “identification documents”, the reference to “Aadhar Card” by ECI as the identification document no. 1 has an ulterior motive. “Aadhaar Card issued by UIDAI” was mentioned as the 15^th identification document by the ECI in its communication dated May 28, 2013 addressed to the Chief Electoral Officer, West Bengal on the subject of “Bye-Election to the House of the People of the West Bengal State-Commission's Order regarding use of Electors Photo Identity Card and other alternative documents for identification of electors at the polling station. 

The ECI’s communication of 2013 reads: “If any elector is not able to produce his/her EPIC, such elector shall have to produce any of the alternative photo documents prescribed. Kindly note that the “Smart Card” being issued under NPR scheme by RGI and “Aadhaar Card” issued by UIDAI have also been included as one of the alternative identity documents.”

From the very beginning ECI has erroneously been referring to “Aadhaar Number” as “Card”. In the beginning, the brand name of the UID number was correctly spelled as “Aadhaar”, not like “Aadhar” in Bengaluru based Adhar Trust or “Aadhar” in “Aadhar Oil” of Ahmedabad based Adani Wilmar Limited (now renamed as AWL Agri Business Ltd ). ECI ought to rectify its mistake. The correct spelling is mentioned in the name of Valsad based Aadhaar Trust.

The list of identification documents have been shrinking since 2010 when 22 identification documents were valid for voter identification. But it is intriguing as to who ordered the ECI to change the position of the Aadhaar from it being the 15th identification document to make “Aadhaar” as the identification document no.1.    

The expression “Aadhar Card” and its placement as 15th identification document or 1st identification needs to be construed by applying the doctrine of ejusdem generis. The use of word ‘such’ implies similarity with what is specifically mentioned before and/or after the general expression. If all the current 12 identification documents or the earlier 15th identification documents are read together, it implies that all  “identification documents”. But the fact is that “Aadhaar” is not similar to any of the other identification documents because it is an “identifier”, it simply identifies a “a person who has resided in India for 182 days prior to enrolment for Aadhaar”, it does not prove anything. It is different from all identification documents because it is not a “document” but is a number.

Section 2 (a) of Aadhaar (Targeted Delivery of Financial and Other Subsidies, Benefits and Services) Act, 2016.reads:“Aadhaar number” means an identification number issued to an individual under sub-section (3) of section 3, and includes any alternative virtual identity generated under sub-section (4) of that section”. Section 3 of the Act reads:”3. Aadhaar number.—(1) Every resident shall be entitled to obtain an Aadhaar number by submitting his demographic information and biometric information by undergoing the process of enrolment: Provided that the Central Government may, from time to time, notify such other category of individuals who may be entitled to obtain an Aadhaar number….(3) On receipt of the demographic information and biometric information under sub-section (1), the Authority shall, after verifying the information, in such manner as may be specified by regulations, issue an Aadhaar number to such individual. (4) The Aadhaar number issued to an individual under sub-section (3) shall be a twelve-digit identification number and any alternative virtual identity as an alternative to the actual Aadhaar number of an individual that shall be generated by the Authority in such manner as may be specified by regulations.” These provisions conclusively establish that “Aadhaar” refers to a 12-digit identification number, not to any “card”. Its advertisement as “Aadhar Card”, an unsigned piece of paper as one of the several specified identification documents is deliberately deceptive.    

It is apparent that media groups, civil society groups like Association of Democratic Reforms (ADR), Bharat Jodo Abhiyan and political parties including Jan Suraj Party, the victor of historic Bankipur election are turning a blind eye towards ECI’s notifications and press notes regarding non-existent “Aadhar Card”.

Disregarding the ten fathom deep burial of the notorious majority opinion of the Supreme Court Justices P. N. Bhagwati, A.N. Ray, M.H. Beg and Y.V. Chandrachud in ADM Jabalpur v. Shivkant Shukla (1976) case that had suspended a person's right to not be unlawfully detained by 9-Judge Constitution Bench in Justice Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017), the majority opinion of Justices A. K. Sikri, Ashok Bhushan, A.M. Khanwilkar and  D. Misra in  Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2018) resurrected the notorious verdict by declaring Aadhaar Act to be partially constitutional on September 26, 2018. The Constitution Bench has declared Section 57 of the Aadhaar Act which enabled body corporate and individual to seek authentication is held to be unconstitutional. Section 57 was titled “Act not to prevent use of Aadhaar number for other purposes under law”. Section 57 provided that “nothing contained in this Act (Aadhaar Act) shall prevent the use of Aadhaar number for establishing the identity of an individual for any purpose, whether by the State or any body corporate or person...” The repeal of the Aadhaar and Other Laws (Amendment) Act 2019 illustrates that  the union government does not wish to omit Section 57 disregarding Court’s judgement in this regard.

UIDAI's Central Identities Data Repository (CIDR) of UID/Aadhaar Numbers and related sensitive information is akin to what Cathy O'Neil refers to as Weapons of Math Destruction while explaining the societal impact of the algorithm. It reveals how the use of big data and algorithms in a variety of fields, including education, and policing, insurance and advertising can lead to decisions that harm the poor, facilitate profiling for the minorities of all shades, reinforce racism, and amplifies inequality and creates a “toxic cocktail for democracy.” Her book won the Euler Book Prize of the Mathematical Association of America in 2019. Features used by UIDAI and its foreign technology solution providers are opaque, unregulated, and difficult to contest. They are also scalable, thereby amplifying any inherent biases to affect increasingly larger populations. These Weapons of Math Destruction are essentially Weapons of Mass Destruction.

Giorgio Agamben, the 74-year-old Italian philosopher who has been teaching at the University of Venice and New York University, predicted in 2004 that the ‘bio-political tattooing’ is the precursor to what would later turn into a normal identity registration of a good citizen. It provides a continuity between the world of the Nazi concentration camp and contemporary democracy. It paves the way for a genocidal liberal order. Biometrics ‘concerns the enrollment and filing away of the most private and incommunicable aspect of subjectivity,which results in the capture of the human body by the authorities for good. Till now such assault on the private human body was an exception, now it is becoming the norm. Surveillance has been used as a tool to shape the relationship between the citizen and the State. Both identification and surveillance have co-existed since time immemorial, but it is now assuming frightening architecture with the marriage of statistics of biological characteristics, and biometric technology with digital sculpture.

Aadhaar Act is aimed at making citizens entitlements like subsidies, benefits and service conditional on their identification based on “biometric information” such as “photograph, finger print, Iris scan, or such other biological attributes”. It suspends citizens’ right to not be denied their entitlements by their servant, the government although “Aadhaar number”is irrelevant for rights and entitlements of citizens.

Notably, before abandoning its ID project, the UK used to cite Estonia as an example. Estonia has a population of 13 lakh people. It has come to light that 750,000 ID and e-residency cards of Estonians posed a security threat because it allowed private keys to be inferred from public keys resulting in the vulnerability of all systems depending upon the privacy of such keys facilitating identity theft or spoofing. It compelled the Estonian government to suspend these IDs. ID card manufacturer Gemalto, a Dutuch company failed to inform the Estonian government about the vulnerability. It has also come to light that Gemalto and the Estonian government have reached a compromise agreement after  the former agreed to pay 2.2 million EUR in compensation.  

It may be recalled that Gemalto is part of World Bank’s eTransform Initiative launched in partnership with Microsoft, Safran, Pfizer, IBM, France and South Korea. India’s UID/Aadhaar scheme is part of biometric experiments underway in 14 developing countries. As a Member of Parliament from Bihar, K.C. Tyagi had raised the issue of threat from “Use of Aadhaar Cards as proof of address for procuring new SIM cards” manufactured by Gemalto, world biggest Sim card manufacturer on 13 March, 2015 in the Rajya Sabha and referred to “I.B. red flag over ADHAR based SIM card”.

Drawing the attention towards  reported hacking into the data of this SIM card manufacturer by US and British intelligence agencies posing a national security threat as the majority of phones in India may have SIMs of that company. Raising the issue during Zero Hour, a senior leader of Rashtriya Lok Dal, K C Tyagi, as the Janata Dal-United MP had said American and British spy agencies have hacked into the database of Dutch company Gemalto. Gemalto's SIM cards are widely used in India including by bureaucrats and the defence establishment. He added that the government's decision to link Aadhaar data base with SIM cards could potentially compromise strategic information. It poses a major national security threat.

Significantly, Sukhendu Sekhar Roy, as the Trinamool Congress MP from West Bengal associated himself “with the concern expressed by Shri K. C. Tyagi.” Since July 2026, he a Rajay Sabha MP from BJP. Notably, the West Bengal assembly is the only State in the country which has passed a unanimous resolution against Aadhaar.

The concerns over the breach of citizens’ data has prompted several state governments to halt the ongoing data collection process for a National Population Register (NPR).  The fear is that the information sought under NPR is much wider in scope and could potentially be used to target a section of the society.

What the anti-NPR advocates did not/do not realise is that there are more solid reasons to fear the NPR because it is not just a census exercise, but a larger data convergence project that can result in the government putting its citizens under surveillance, that is unwarranted and dangerous to the secular and constitutional credentials of the country. NPR's linkage with Aadhaar number plays a central role here.

In fact, NPR of Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) and CIDR of UID/Aadhaar numbers of Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology (MEITY) has created an architecture for indiscriminate mass surveillance of the present and future voters who are being structurally coerced to give their consent to the immoral and illegitimate exercise of their profiling for countless times.

It has turned every newborn into a suspect. There is a file being created to track and profile him for good. Like one Indian NSA's threat to his adversaries about having a file on them, having a UID/Aadhaar number and NPR automatically creates a file of the Indian residents in question. Even infants are not spared in this cruel scheme of things.

In a country where no intelligence chief or official has held accountable for the assassination of two of its Prime Ministers and for betraying nation's secrets, can it be hoped that all those who compromised India's data security will be made liable for their treacherous acts of transferring the sensitive data of present and future citizens including ministers, soldiers, judges and ministers?

There is a compelling logic for setting up a High Powered Commission of Inquiry to probe the ongoing bartering of citizen's databases and transfer of national data assets to foreign entities.

The States should un-sign the MoUs they have signed with UIDAI and discontinue both UID/Aadhaar and NPR exercise to resist the emergence of an unlimited government, unlimited by the Constitution of India and Constitutionalism.

No opposition party can be considered the voice of the people unless it promises to repeal Aadhaar Act, the black law because of the following reasons:

1. The majority order of the Supreme Court's 5-Judge Constitution Bench on September 26, 2018, has pointed out that the UID/Aadhaar Number project and NPR project are part of the one database convergence scheme. NPR has been mentioned at least on eight occasions in the order to underline the same. A centralized database is the most vulnerable entity in the digital world. The leakage of the database of UK’s children has revealed the old maxim, “If you have nothing to hide, you have nothing to fear, has been given a very public burial”. This has been thoroughly debunked. This maxim is attributed to Nazi propaganda minister Joseph Goebbels.

2. At paragraph 8 of the majority order authored by Justice A K Sikri, it is recorded that "a Processes Committee was set up on July 03, 2006, to suggest the process for updation, modification, addition and deletion of data and fields from the core database to be created under the Unique Identification for BPL Families project.

This Committee, on November 26, 2006, prepared a paper known as 'Strategic Vision Unique Identification of Residents'. Based thereupon, the Empowered Group of Ministers (EGoM) was set up on December 04, 2006, to collate the National Population Register under the Citizenship Act, 1955 and the Unique Identification Number project of the Department "of Information Technology.

Subsequently, "a Committee of Secretaries was formed. The said Committee gave its recommendations which were discussed by EGoM. After approving the Aadhaar Scheme in principle, it instructed the Cabinet Secretary to convene a meeting to finalise the detailed organisational structure of the UID.

After considering the recommendation of the Cabinet Secretary, Notification No. A-43011/02/2009-Admn.I was issued on January 28, 2009, by the Government of India which constituted and notified the UIDAI."  Annexure 1 of this notification that constituted UIDAI deals with the Role and Responsibilities of UIDAI. The fourth point in this notification reads: "implementation of UID scheme will entail" taking "necessary steps to ensure collation of NPR with UID (as per. approved strategy)".

3. The minutes of a meeting of the Committee of Secretaries held under Chairmanship of Cabinet Secretary November 23, 2015 talks of "integrating the twin approaches under NPR and Aadhaar."

The "integrating the twin approaches under NPR and Aadhaar" which is referred here is the same as taking "necessary steps to ensure collation of NPR with UID (as per. approved strategy)" underlined in the notification mentioned in the Aadhaar Act.

4. A Ministry of Home Affairs communication dated July 19, 2019 states that "The National Population Register (NPR) thus prepared, was seeded with Aadhaar number during its updation exercise in 2015 along with a collection of demographic details of new household members. Approx. 60 crores Aadhaar numbers have been seeded in NPR Database."

This communication discloses that "It has now been decided by the Ministry of Home Affairs to update the existing NPR database during April 2020 - September 2020 along with House listing & Housing Census phase of Census 2021. While updating the NPR, the Aadhaar number of all the individuals whose Aadhaar number is not available in the NPR Database will also be collected along with various other items. Necessary notification for updating NPR in 2020 will be issued shortly." The disclosure needs to be factored in the backdrop of the Census 2027 which being conducted through digital means.

5. The Court's order reveals that "A core group was set up to advise and further the work related to UIDAI...The core group, inter alia, decided that it was better to start with the electoral roll database of 2009 for undertaking the UIDAI project." If an UID/Aadhaar-enabled Biometric Attendance System is indeed a ‘digital equivalent’ of an ‘age-old attendance register,’ why did the National Human Rights Commission object to a radio collar which can also be argued by sophists to be a ‘digital equivalent’? It may be recalled that the Union ministry of external affairs had agreed with the NHRC’s assessment. The Union minister of external affairs informed Parliament that some 18 students were detained and released in the US with radio monitoring devices on their ankles, pending completion of investigations for possible involvement in irregularities. ``We have also strongly protested the radio collars as unacceptable, which should be removed immediately.’ If the ‘digital equivalent’ means biometric equivalent as well, then radio collar and DNA-based identity and attendance will also be deemed equivalent to ‘age-old attendance register.’ It is quite evident that such claims are deeply misleading.

6. The reference to ‘such other biological attributes’ in Section 2 (g) of Aadhaar (Targeted Delivery of Financial and Other Subsidies, Benefits and Services) Act, 2016, and the definition of ‘biometrics’ under the Information Technology (Reasonable security practices and procedures and sensitive personal data or information) Rules, 2011 under section 87 read with section 43A of Information Technology Act, 2000 underlines that it includes ‘the technologies that measure and analyse human body characteristics, such as “fingerprints”, “eye retinas and irises”, “voice patterns”, “facial patterns”, “hand measurements” and “DNA” for authentication purposes.’ It is abundantly clear that the plan of UID/Aadhaar-based surveillance does not end with the collection of fingerprints and iris scan, it goes quite beyond it. If surveillance is not a big deal, why is Edward Snowden in Moscow since June 23, 2013? Why is Australian journalist Julian Assange one of the 675 prisoners in Belmarsh, a category A prison, in London since April 2019 and why was he in the Ecuadorian embassy in London since July 19, 2012? If surveillance is indeed such an innocent act, then why are the entire US and European establishments paranoid about surveillance including electoral surveillance from Russia? 

It is apparent that the merger of Voter-ID Number and Aadhaar Number through amendment in Aadhaar Act, an exercise in merger of electoral database and Aadhaar database will lead to total control of the extinguish political and civil rights of present and future generations by such rewriting of the political geography of the country with hitherto unknown adverse consequences.    

So far the Supreme Court has not had the occasion to examine the most glaring aspect of unlimited-cyber biometric surveillance, which entails close observation of all the present and future Indians indiscriminately as suspects. Drawing lessons from both the ruling and opposition parties of UK, Indian parties too should repeal of Aadhaar Act, a mini-Constitution emulating the example of 44th Constitutional Amendment Act, 1978 because in the name of biometric identification, civil death of citizens is being normalised and naturalised as if Article 21 of the Constitution has been abrogated.

Dr. Gopal Krishna 

Also read: Why world's tallest opposition leader is falling in Chakravyuh and Lakshagriha of Dark Money Group?: India's First Mass Surveillance, Mass Spying Unending Census Case-Part 20

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 (The author is a practicing advocate and a researcher of philosophy, mass communication and law. His current work is focused on the philosophy of digital totalitarianism and the monetisation of nature. He has appeared before the Supreme Court's Committees, Parliamentary Committees of Europe, Germany and India and UN agencies on the subject of national and international legislations on UID/Aadhaar/NPR, DNA profiling through criminal identification procedures, nuclear damage, consumers, land acquisition, biological diversity, finance, hazardous waste trade, water cycle and corporate crimes since 2001. He is an ex-Fellow, International Research Group on Authoritarianism and Counter Strategies (IRGAC)-University of Potsdam, Germany.)

In the aftermath of the enactment of Sustainable Harnessing and Advancement of Nuclear Energy for Transforming India (SHANTI) Act, which has replaced the Atomic Energy Act, 1962 and the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act, 2010, on August 16, 2026, DAE announced that it is holding a Public Consultation on Draft SHANTI Rules and Draft SHANTI Regulations inviting suggestions and feedback from stakeholders, industry representatives, institutions, experts, and members of the public on the draft documents in a specified format for Draft Rules and Draft Regulations. The last date for comments on the draft documents ended on September 4, 2026. ToxicsWatch has written to DAE seeking extension of time for comments both the draft Rules and Regulations till October 30, 2026. 

Earlier, Union Minister of State for Prime Minister’s office and Personnel, Public Grievances and Pensions, Atomic Energy and Space, Dr. Jitendra Singh informed Lok Sabha on July 29, 2026 that "Typically, radioactive solid waste arising from nuclear power plants, including waste generated during the  perational life and decommissioning of the plants, is within 0.15 cubic meters/year/MW. Records relating to the quantity and location of radioactive waste disposed of are regularly filed with the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB)." The minister was responding to first of the five questions addressed to the Prime Minister by Navin Jindal. The first question sought "(a) the details of the total volume of radioactive waste generated annually along with the radioactive waste management facilities available in India since 2019, State-wise and year-wise." It is evident that the minister who was responding on behalf the Prime Minister provided an evasive reply.  

Responding to the second and the third questions, the minister assured the parliament that "Safe management of nuclear waste has been accorded high priority right from the inception of our nuclear energy programme. Government of India has promulgated the Atomic Energy (Safe Disposal of Radioactive Wastes) Rules, 1987 which establishes the legal requirements for safe management and disposal of radioactive waste. As per these Rules, all facilities generating radioactive waste are required to have an Authorization from AERB to discharge radioactive effluents. The authorization specifies the volume and activity of the waste that can be disposed by the facility through designated routes. The limits for radioactive effluent discharges specified by AERB are based on the internationally followed norms and safe practices. The radioactive waste handling, treatment, storage and disposal are required to be carried out as per the well laid down procedures and guidelines stipulated by AERB. As a waste management philosophy, no waste in any physical form is released/disposed to the environment unless the same is cleared, exempted or excluded from regulations. A comprehensive radioactive waste management is established for the management of radioactive waste from nuclear power plants and back-end fuel cycle. Nuclear waste in the form of gaseous, liquid and solid is generated during operation & maintenance activities of nuclear power plants. (a) Gaseous waste is treated at the source of generation. The techniques used are adsorption on activated charcoal and filtration by high efficiency particulate air filter. (b) Liquid waste streams are treated by various techniques, such as filtration, adsorption, chemical treatment, evaporation, ion exchange, reverse osmosis etc. depending upon the nature, volume & radioactivity content. (c) The radioactive solid wastes generated during operation and maintenance of nuclear power plants are segregated and volume reduced prior to its disposal. Disposal of waste is carried out in specially constructed structures such as stone lined trenches, reinforced concrete trenches, and tile holes. These disposal structures are located both above and under-ground in access-controlled areas and are designed based on multi barrier principle for ensuring effective containment of the radioactivity. The areas where the disposal structures are located are kept under constant surveillance with the help of bore-wells laid out in a planned manner by routinely monitoring the underground soil and water samples to confirm effective confinement of radioactivity present in the disposed waste. Till date the surveillance of the disposal areas at different sites has confirmed the high degree of effectiveness of the disposal system for the containment of the disposed wastes. There has been no incident of release of radioactivity from such disposed wastes. No effect of radiation from the disposed wastes on the public or the environment has been observed. High level radioactive waste generated during reprocessing of spent fuel is converted into glass through a process, called vitrification. The vitrified waste is stored for an interim period in a Solid Storage Surveillance Facility at par with international practices as per the guidelines of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Technological advances based on partitioning of the waste enables separation and recovery of useful radio-isotopes such as Cesium-137 (Cs-137), Ruthenium-106 (Ru-106) and Strontium-90 (Sr-90), for health care applications. Apart from the recovery of valuable radionuclides, partitioning technology enables separation of long-lived radioisotopes including actinides prior to immobilizing in glass matrices. Partitioning technology has significantly reduced the quantity of residual waste to be stored." 

The second and the third questions reads:"(b) the details of the advanced technologies that are being adopted for the treatment and disposal of radioactive waste to minimize environmental impact; (c) the steps taken by the Government to ensure safe and effective management of radioactive waste by strengthening its disposal mechanisms." 

It is apparent from the reply that the minister maintained a studied silence about the conflict-of-interest ridden regulatory institutional mechanism for the implementation of the 28-page long Atomic Energy (Safe Disposal of Radioactive Wastes) Rules, 1987 framed in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (1) read with clause (i) of sub-section (2) of Section 30 and clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 17 of the Atomic Energy Act, 1962. The Rules are implemented by Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) which has been constituted by Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) on November 15, 1983 in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 27 of the Atomic Energy Act, 1962, which has now been repealed. AERB, the regulator of nuclear commerce reports to DAE, which is the promoter of nuclear commerce. Can the former regulate the latter with its independence from DAE?  

The fact remains AERB is also empowered to perform the functions under sections 10(1) (powers of entry) and 11(1) (powers to take samples) of Environmental Protection Act, 1986 and Rule 12 (agency to which information on excess discharge of pollutants to be given) of the Environmental Protection (Amendment)Rules, 1987 with respect to radioactive substances. Also Section 52 of Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981 states that in relation to the radioactive air pollution the provisions of Atomic Energy Act will apply. Notably, the minister did not refer to the provisions of SHANTI Act, 2025 for radioactive waste disposal management.  

Replying to the fourth question, the minister said: "Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) is committed to ensure safe management of radioactive wastes, in accordance with best practices. Nuclear wastes are safely managed/disposed as per the provisions of Atomic Energy (Safe Disposal of Radioactive Wastes) Rules 1987. The regulatory frameworks for waste management in the country are aligned with international best practices and are at par with guidelines of IAEA. Further, Environmental Survey Laboratories (ESLs) are established at all atomic power plants to regularly monitor various environmental matrices and compare with baseline radiation level recorded prior to operation of nuclear facility. The effluents from the facilities are treated and monitored before discharging to ensure compliance of regulatory limits."

The fourth question sought details about "(d) the steps taken by the Government to ensure that India’s radioactive waste management aligns with international best practices and the Government’s broader  vision for nuclear safety and environmental protection". 

The minister reply confined itself to the "guidelines" of the IAEA, it did not elaborate on the "international best practices and the Government’s broader  vision for nuclear safety and environmental protection". Are IAEA guidelines same as ""international best practices and the Government’s broader  vision for nuclear safety and environmental protection"? Were these IAEA guidelines ensure best practices and the Government’s broader  vision for nuclear safety and environmental protection in Fukushima? Has it been revised in the aftermath of the disaster?  

Responding to the fifth question regarding long-term plans and initiatives for the permanent disposal of highlevel radioactive waste, the minister informed: "DAE is pursuing closed fuel cycle where spent fuel from domestic source is considered as a material of resource. Most of the useful components of spent fuel are reprocessed as fuel for future reactors. High level radioactive waste generated during the reprocessing is converted into vitrified glass through a process called vitrification. With advent of partitioning technologies, segregation of long-lived radioactive constituents including actinides and extraction of useful radioisotopes from high level radioactive waste for societal application can result in significant reduction of waste-volume prior to vitrification eliminating the need of deep geological repository in near future." 

The fifth question reads: "(e) whether the Government has any long-term plans for the permanent disposal of highlevel radioactive waste and any initiatives being taken for deep geological repositories and if so, the details thereof?"

It is evident that the minister's reply could not provide details about long-term plans for the permanent disposal of highlevel radioactive waste. His routine response regarding regarding DAE's current activities does not inspire even iota of confidence about nuclear safety and safe disposal of nuclear waste. There is nothing in the reply to suggest that lessons have been learnt from the Fukushima disaster. 

Purochana, the architect and adviser of Duryodhana in the Mahabharata was employed to construct the Lakshagriha (lacquer house) to entrap and kill Pandavas. Dronacharya, the commander-in-chief of Kaurva’s military force had designed the Chakravyuh (military labyrinth) in which Abhimanyu was trapped and killed. India's opposition leaders were detained and housed under carcinogenic asbestos roofs during 21 months of Emergency. National Human Rights Commission has recommended its removal. India's External Affairs Ministry was sold asbestos laden building by its "ally" in Washington D.C which poses a challenge in preparing it for use as an Indian Cultural Centre. In Greek mythology, there is a story about "Shirt of Nessus", the fabric steeped in a deadly, slow-absorbing toxin, which caused the death of Heracles. The shirt was given to him by Deianira, his faithful wife who was misled by Nessus, his enemy to dye the shirt with venom. By the time she realized that she was tricked, it was too late  Jane Mayer refers to the USA's Democratic Party's innocent use of a "carpet" manufactured by the company of its political adversary in her book Dark Money: The Hidden History of the Billionaires Behind the Rise of the Radical Right.   

Unless one ascertains the real owner of the Lakshagriha, the mind behind designer of the Chakravyuh and the manufacturer of shirt or digital shirt, carpet or digital carpet and gift or digital gift, fatal consequence of residing, entering, wearing, gifting or standing on them cannot be avoided. The collaborators who are master creators of irreality, disguise themselves as loyalists and commit “innocent” fraud on their leaders. Political gullibility manifests itself in myriad ways. More than 50 Prime Ministers and heads of States including 2 from USA and 2 from India have been assassinated. Seven US Presidents have survived assassination attempts but most of the loyalists and intelligence officials who betrayed or were guilty of dereliction of duty towards them have not been made accountable.The opposition leaders including those whose stature was/is taller than the Prime Ministers and Presidents have always been vulnerable.  

The cartel of automatic identification (ID) firms operating from Washington, Paris, London, Brussels and Davos responded by getting a “Task Force for preparation of Policy Document on Identity and Access Management under India’s National e-Governance Program” constituted in October 2006.

The cartel deployed Purochana like persons in India’s oldest political party through its youth wing at an unguarded moment in order to impregnate the party with an “innocent” idea of a digital cave akin to modern day Lakshagriha based on automatic identification of individuals. Subsequently, unique clones of Purochana were installed within the union government, state governments, armed forces, ruling parties, opposition parties and media houses.

Notably, there was formal launch of the World Bank’s eTransform Initiative on April 23, 2010, in Washington for converging private sector, citizen sector and public sector and subsequent to Interpol’s e-identity database project and UID related initiatives of North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). Ignoring the recommendations of a study by LSE against "inappropriate" biometric national ID with "capability to electronically trace and profile all" published in June 2005, the Task Force for preparation of Policy Document on Identity and Access Management submitted a report which disclosed the “Indian” version of the UK’s National Identity Card scheme is being packaged and initiated as Unique ID (UID) scheme "to create a central database of resident in the country". Notably, the 34 members of the “Indian” Task Force included representatives from the Technology Solution Providers like i. IBM, ii. Microsoft, iii. Oracle, iv. Computer Associates, v. Novell, vi. Honeywell, vii. HP, viii. Red Hat, ix. ILANTUS Technologies, x. MPhasis and xi. PwC besides other members from NIC, Department of Information Technology (DIT), National Institute for Smart Government, Ministry of Commerce and Industry's Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion (E-BizProject), Standardisation Testing and Quality Certification Directorate, ECIL, Centre for Development of Advanced Computing, Department of Administrative Reforms and Public Grievances, Osmania University, IIT Kharagpur, Indian Institute of Information Technology, Bangalore and Society for Promotion of e-Governance in India. The “Indian” concept of unique identification (UID) scheme was first discussed in 2006. The administrative approval for the project "Unique ID for BPL families" was given on March 3, 2006 by Department of Information Technology, Ministry of Communications & Information Technology during the tenure Dayanidhi Maran as the minister. 

The Planning Commission's Process Committee led by Dr Arvind Virmani was formed on July 3, 2006 to suggest processes for updation, modification, addition and deletion of data fields from core database under "Unique ID for BPL families’ project. The Committee hired Wipro Ltd as its consultant. Wipro prepared a 14-page long "Strategic Vision: Unique Identification of Residents" in July 2006 envisaging the close linkage that the UID Number with the electoral database. Another 15-page long Wipro document entitled "Does India need a Unique Identity Number?" cited example of UK's Identity Cards Act, 2006 to advance the argument for a biometric UID (Aadhaar) Number. 

After UK repealed The Identity Cards Act 2006 by The Identity Documents Act 2010 to abandon its National ID card project, the beneficial owners of Wipro, the advocates of biometric UID (Aadhaar) scheme and the donors of ruling partied and opposition parties  think their cunning and deceptive silence will justify continued incorporation of biometric identification under the Aadhaar Act, 2016, a clone of UK’s Identity Cards Act, 2006. Having introduced Purochana like individuals in country’s grand old party from the firms that are part of World Ban’s eTransform Initiative, these donors are under the impression that world’s tallest opposition leader will not repeal Aadhaar Act, 2016, the way UK has repealed it.

Unlike the accounting report of the LSE, the report of the Comptroller Auditor General (CAG) of India reveals that CAG was misled to belief that it was Department of Information Technology, not Wipro Ltd which submitted the “Strategic Vision–Unique Identification of Residents" to Process Committee, which approved a UID Authority like entity to be created by executive order. The Process Committee furnished a detailed proposal in this regard. Notably, CAG was misled to ensure that it does not audit the conduct of erstwhile Planning Commission's Process Committee and Wipro Ltd, their consultant who has been accused of 'undue favours' in the Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI) project by CAG. The report of Dr. S.I. Ahson headed 34-member Task Force for preparation of Policy Document on Identity and Access Management had revealed in April 2007 that the Project Unique ID (UID) is "to create a central database of resident in the country".

A confidential document of UIDAI titled ‘Creating a unique identity number for every resident in India’, leaked by Wikileaks on November 13, 2009 reads: “One way to ensure that the unique identification (UID) number is used by all government and private agencies is by inserting it into the birth certificate of the infant. Since the birth certificate is the original identity document, it is likely that this number will then persist as the key identifier through the individual’s various life events, such as joining school, immunizations, voting etc.” CAG’s audit report failed to audit the deleterious impact of UID/Aadhaar database for the electoral  database and the fundamental right of voters.

The establishment of the UIDAI for issuance of 12-digit Unique Identity unique identification (UID)/Aadhaar numbers assigned to the residents of India in January 2009 and the enactment of Aadhaar (Targeted Delivery of Financial and Other Subsidies, Benefits, and Services) Act, 2016, the second e-commerce law through a Money Bill has been detected to be constitutionally questionable by a 5-Judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court of India. In the meanwhile, over 144 crore Aadhaar Numbers have been issued as of March 2026. Initially, UID/Aadhaar Number was declared “voluntary” as a fish bait, drawing lessons from a similar project in Pakistan and subsequently it has been made mandatory in an illegitimate manner. The union government claims that over 2200 social welfare schemes of government using Aadhaar Number. It has also claimed that more than 270 good governance schemes and services are using Aadhaar Number and around 500 entities in the financial and telecom sectors have notified to use Aadhaar Number and numerous private and public service providers employing offline verification of Aadhaar Number for rendering services to individuals.

The commercial czars who are benefiting from Aadhaar Number Online Database were brought to light in Comptroller Auditor General (CAG)'s audit report on UIDAI's performance. But government which misled Lok Sabha on July 20, 2022 about Action Taken Report is now using media blitzkrieg to defend the indefensible Aadhaar Number project in the aftermath of the revelation by CAG’s audit report on the performance of UIDAI, a creature of Aadhaar Act.

Like the CAG’s audit report of 2016, the CAG’s audit report released in April 2022 too makes a specific reference to WIPRO Ltd. There is a reference to Agreement with Data Centre Development Agency (DCDA), Bengaluru and Agreement with DCDA, Manesar with Wipro Ltd. CAG has remarked that “The file related to AMC part  was only provided for scrutiny. The file related to selection process of the vendor was not made available. Since the contract involved technical issues, the same was out of the scope of the Audit for scrutiny.” Had UIDAI provided the required files related to “selection process of the vendor”, the audit report would have ensured that sunlight is indeed the best disinfectant.

The Executive Summary of CAG’s audit report begins by talking about “Identification of the right individuals” for “welfare schemes”. Immediately after that it starts talking about how “Citizens were required to furnish multiple documents….to various Government as well as private agencies.” It refers to the inconvenience of “those who did not have any of these identity documents.” It states that in order to “overcome the challenge, the Union Government decided to introduce a unique identity (UID) for the residents of India” in 2009. Contrary to the claims of the promoters of biometric UID/Aadhaar like Nandan Nilekani that “Millions of people without any ID, now have an ID”, the fact is that of all the Aadhaar numbers issued to Indian residents till date – 99.97 per cent had pre-existing identification (ID) documents. This has been revealed in a reply to an application of Ujjainee Sharma and Trishna Senapaty under Right to Information Act by UIDAI. This proves that ‘an inability to prove identity” has not a major barrier to access benefits and subsidies.

CAG’s audit report has detected that “There were instances of issue of Aadhaars with the same biometric data to different residents indicating flaws in the de-duplication process and issue of Aadhaars on faulty biometrics and documents.” It underlines that the Aadhaar database continued to have ‘such questionable’ Aadhaars.

The report asserts that “Issue of Aadhaar numbers to minor children below the age of five, based on the biometrics of their parents, without confirming uniqueness of biometric identity goes against the basic tenet of the Aadhaar Act” unmindful of the fact that “Supreme Court has stated that no benefit will be denied to any child for want of Aadhaar.” It brings to light the fact that UIDAI continues to incur avoidable expenditure on the issue of Bal Aadhaars.

Unmindful of legal complications or inconvenience to holders of Aadhaar issued prior to 2016, UIDAI has failed to identify and fill the missing documents in their database.

The audit report points out that “the quality of data captured to issue initial Aadhaar was not good enough to establish uniqueness of identity.” It reveals that UIDAI is “not in a position to identify reasons for biometric failures and residents were not at fault for capture of poor quality of biometrics.” It also reveals that UIDAI does “not have a system to analyze the factors leading to authentication errors.” UIDAI has failed to “carry out verification of the infrastructure and technical support of Requesting Entities and Authentication Service Agencies before their appointment in the Authentication Ecosystem.” UIDAI has failed to adopt a “data archiving policy, which is considered to be a vital storage management best practice” while maintaining one of the largest biometric databases in the world.

In violation of the Supreme Court’s verdict and in violation of Aadhaar Act 2016 (as amended in 2019), UIDAI is providing “Authentication services to banks, mobile operators and other agencies”. In the aftermath of the deletion of Section 57 which provided for “the use of Aadhaar number for establishing the identity of an individual for any purpose, whether by the State or any body corporate or person, pursuant to any law, for the time being in force, or any contract to this effect”.

The deletion of this provision was in compliance with the Court’s judgment. In the majority judgment, it is stated that apart from authorising the State, even ‘any body corporate or person’ is authorised to avail authentication services. This can be on the basis of purported agreement between an individual and such a body corporate or person. Even if we presume that the legislature did not intend so, the impact of the aforesaid features would be to enable commercial exploitation of individual biometric and demographic information by the private entities. 

The part of Section 57 that allowed for people to voluntarily provide their Aadhaar number to body corporates and individuals, especially on the basis of a contract between the person providing the Aadhaar number and the person acquiring/ authenticating the Aadhaar number, has been held to be unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. But the amendment to Section 4 of the Aadhaar Act that deals with ‘Properties of Aadhaar number” re-introduced clauses that have already been ruled to be unconstitutional.

The audit report reveals that the UIDAI has failed to levy penalties on Biometric Service Providers for deficiencies in their performance in respect of biometric de-duplication and biometric authentication. CAG has recommended that “Agreements in this regard should be modified, if required”. This also creates a logical compulsion for States ruled by opposition parties to unsign their MoUs with UIDAI.

The audit of the functioning of UIDAI reveals that UID/Aadhaar has put the privacy of present and future residents, Prime Ministers, Chief Ministers, judges, legislators, soldiers, civil servants and intelligence officials and their families at risk. It shows how contracts awarded by UIDAI in the name of the President of India to favour private entities.

The audit report concludes that “There were flaws in the management of various contracts entered into by UIDAI. The decision to waive off penalties for biometric solution providers was not in the interest of the Authority giving undue advantage to the solution providers, sending out an incorrect message of acceptance of poor quality of biometrics captured by them.”

The report also reveals that “UIDAI had not ensured that the client applications used by its authentication ecosystem partners were not capable of storing the personal information of the residents, which put the privacy of residents at risk. The Authority had not ensured security and safety of data in Aadhaar vaults. They had not independently conducted any verification of compliance to the process involved.”  

CAG has detected that although the “Aadhaar Act stipulates that an individual should reside in India for a period of 182 days or more in the twelve months immediately preceding the date of application for being eligible to obtain an Aadhaar. In September 2019, this condition was relaxed for non-resident Indians, holding valid Indian Passport. However, UIDAI has not prescribed any specific proof/ document or process for confirming whether an applicant has resided in India for the specified period and takes confirmation of the residential status through a casual self-declaration from the applicant. There was no system in place to check the affirmations of the applicant. As such, there is no assurance that all the Aadhaar holders in the country are ‘Residents’ as defined in the Aadhaar Act.”

But CAG is yet to audit contracts by UIDAI that enabled transfer of Central Identities Data Repository (CIDR) containing all Aadhaar numbers along with corresponding  demographic information and biometric information of Indian residents to foreign and domestic firms, recommend deletion and fix accountability for such a grave act that compromises national security. Notably, Banks and Telecom operators are not mentioned in the Aadhaar Act. All advertisements, SMSs and demands for Aadhaar number are illegitimate and illegal. Supreme Court has declared Section 57 of Aadhaar Act as “Unconstitutional”, outlawing Aadhaar “use for other purposes”.

In such a backdrop, how can world’ tallest opposition leader, his party and allies consider Aadhaar Number database to be deemed legitimate unmindful of the fact that Section 57 of the Aadhaar Act which enabled data transfer to private entities has been declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Bench of the Supreme Court of India?

It is apparent that the case against Aadhaar Act is pending before a 7-judge Constitution Bench since November 13, 2019 due to lack of judicial courage in the aftermath of the dismissal of Justice Clara Sooronkulova, a judge at the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Kyrgyzstan by Parliament of the Central Asian state to ensure that biometric identification law is not declared unconstitutional by her.

Justice Sooronkulova said, “everyone has to decide for himself whether he wants them to trust the state or not. If you do not deal with politics, politics will deal with you.” Endorsing her position, Temirbek Asanbekov, a former presidential candidate of Kyrgyzstan, reacted, “By introducing biometric registration as a condition for participating in the election, the state creates artificial barriers. To elect and be elected is a constitutional right and not an obligation. We should bear in mind the general state of information security in the country. Citizens’ data could become accessible by various extortionists or even international terrorists. Who will guarantee that evil-minded people will not gain access to this database?” Her dismissal has widely been noted as an act of governmental interference in judiciary. She was sacked on June 18, 2015.. There seems to be a relationship between the sacking of a judge at the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Kyrgyzstan and the inability of the 7-Judge Bench to adjudicate against Aadhaar Act, which has been found to be unconstitutional by a Supreme Court’s 5-Judge Constitution Bench of India in Rojer Mathew vs. South Indian Bank Ltd. & Ors.  [2019] 16 S.C.R. 

The opposition parties, citizens’ parties and independent media are yet to adopt the insight from this judgement to promise the repeal of Aadhaar Act and related schemes. UK’s example demonstrates that national electronic-biometric scheme enabling laws can be repealed and initiatives like centralised National ID database and CIDR of UID/Aadhaar Numbers are reversible, not eternal and irreversible. Unlike UK, so far the parties in India have not been able to demonstrate political courage in this regard           

Significantly, Information Technology (Reasonable security practices and procedures and sensitive personal data or information) Rules, 2011 framed under sections 87 (2) and 43A of the Information Technology Act, 2000 refers to biometric “technologies that measure and analyse human body characteristics, such as 'fingerprints', 'eye retinas and irises', 'voice patterns', "facial patterns', 'hand measurements' and 'DNA' for authentication purposes.” It is apparent that the term “Information Technology” and digital-biometric identity is pregnant with wider meaning which has unprecedented political consequences. The explicit and implicit provisions of the IT law, Aadhaar law and free digital trade deals with countries like USA and UK creates a compelling necessity for globe’s tallest opposition leader to safeguard Indians from Venezuela and Iran like digital gullibility by using political imagination of the freedom struggle against imperialism in myriad disguises.  

After the defeat of the Tony Blair led Labour Party government, which knowingly took UK into an illegal and illegitimate war against Iraq, the scheme was scrapped by the coalition government of David Cameron-Nick Clegg led Conservative Party-Liberal Party government. But the its spectre continued to haunt citizens of UK after the return of the Blair-era regressive biometric identification policies of the Labour Party till July 21, 2026, when the new Burnham led Labour Government announced that it has cancelled the digital ID programme, the mother of India’s digitial-biometric ID programme branded as Aadhaar.

Ironically, unmindful of UK’s 2010 Act that repealed UK’s biometric national ID scheme, UK’s firms like Ernst & Young signed a contract agreement in February 2010 with the President of India for UIDAI. In an RTI reply dated October 25, 2013, UIDAI shared a truncated contract agreement with Ernst & Young. The contract agreement states that “the Unique ID will be a random 12-digit number with the basis for establishing uniqueness of identity being biometrics”. It announces that “we will provide a Unique Identity to over 113.9 crore people.” This is evidently a fraudulent announcement because UIDAI with which the agreement has been signed had the mandate to provide Unique Identity to only 60 crore residents of India, and not to 113.9 crore people. It is evident that while the government kept Ernst & Young informed about its motive, it kept states, citizens, the parliament and the Supreme Court in the dark. The contract agreement reveals that “biometric systems are not 100 % accurate” and “uniqueness of the biometrics is still a postulate.” This admission pulverizes the deceptive edifice on which MEITY’s UID/Aadhaar of Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology and National Population Register (NPR) of Ministry of Home Affairs rests.

The "Digital Identity Sectoral Analysis Report 2026" of UK's Office for Digital Identities and Attributes, Department for Science, Innovation and Technology based on an updated study of the digital identity sector in the UK which was published on July 8, 2026 reveals that the registered UK location of the 275 digital identity firms. The report has identified domestic and global office locations for all firms in scope. This data suggests that the majority of firms are founded or headquartered in the UK (73%, 202 firms), and over one in four (27%, 73 firms) are founded or headquartered internationally, but have a UK presence via a registered entity. Out of the 202 UK headquartered firms, 73 (36%) appear to have at least one office outside of the UK. The majority of internationally headquartered firms are based in the USA (45) with the remainder from countries such as Switzerland, France, Israel, Australia, the Netherlands, and 12 other countries. For the 73 UK-headquartered firms with a physical presence in international markets, the report found that 214 offices across 51 countries including 15 in India (21%) with reference to UK headquartered companies with a physical presence in India.

Are they working to promote India's supreme national interest, the way UK did so through its presence in India during 1605-1947? Did these offices play any role in the finalization of Article 12.7 on "Digital Identities" and Article 12.12 on "Open Government Data" under Chapter 12 on Digital Trade in the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between India and UK signed on July 24, 2025 and which entered into force on July 15, 2026 subsequent to negotiations which were launched on January 13, 2022.

Article 12.7 of the agreement reads: "Digital Identities-1. The Parties recognise that cooperation between the Parties on digital identities will promote connectivity and further growth of digital trade, while recognising that each Party may take different legal and technical approaches to digital identities. Accordingly, the Parties shall endeavour to pursue mechanisms to promote compatibility between their respective digital identity regimes. 2. The Parties shall endeavour to facilitate initiatives to promote compatibility, which may include:(a) fostering technical cooperation between each Party’s implementation of digital identities; (b) developing comparable protection of digital identities under each Party’s legal framework; (c) supporting the development of international frameworks on digital identity regimes; (d) identifying and implementing use cases for the mutual recognition of digital identities; and (e) exchanging knowledge and expertise on best practices relating to digital identity policies and regulations, technical implementation standards and security standards, and the promotion of the use of digital identities." 

It is apparent that UK has signed the agreement after the groundwork for control of India’s data wealth and resources has been done by entities like Ernst & Young. As per the contract agreement of UIDAI with Ernst & Young, the latter can keep data of all present and future Indians up to seven years!    

Article 12.12 of the agreement reads: "For the purposes of this Article, “government data and information” means non-proprietary data and information held by the central level of government and, to the extent provided for under a Party’s laws and regulations, by other levels of government. 2. The Parties recognise that facilitating public access to and use of government data and information stimulates economic and social development, competitiveness, and innovation. To this end, each Party is encouraged to expand the coverage of government data and information digitally available for public access and use through engagement and consultation with interested stakeholders. 3. Each Party shall provide interested persons with a mechanism to request the disclosure of specific government data and information. 4. To the extent that a Party chooses to make government data and information available to the public, it shall endeavour to ensure that to the extent possible the data and information is in a machine-readable and open format, and can be searched, retrieved, used, reused, and redistributed. 5. To the extent that a Party chooses to make government data and information available to the public, it shall endeavour to avoid imposing a condition that unduly prevents or restricts the user of that data and information from: (a) reproducing, redistributing, or republishing the data and information; (b) regrouping the data and information; or (c) using the data and information for commercial and non-commercial purposes, including in the process of production of a new product or service. 6. The Parties shall endeavour to cooperate to identify ways in which each Party can expand access to, and use of, government data and information that the Party has made public, with a view to enhancing and generating business, and innovation opportunities, especially for SMEs, including start-ups." 

A joint reading of the India-UK agreement and the contract agreement between UIDAI and Ernst & Young indicates that The Repealing and Amending Act, 2023 was enacted a low key manner to repeal The Aadhaar and Other Laws (Amendment) Act, 2019 through Section 2 and the First Schedule of the 2023 Act to undo the omission of Section 57 of the Aadhaar Act, 2016 through the 2019 Act and to facilitate the “Digital Trade” and “Open Government Data” related provisions under India-UK agreement, a bilateral international law. It is apparent that it is an attempt to outwit the judgement by the Supreme Court of India.    

After Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement between India and UK came into force, Burnham became UK’s Prime Minister on July 20, 2026. A Research Briefing on “Digital ID in the UK” published on September 4, 2026 by the Library of UK’s Parliament wherein, he is quoted as having stated on September 29, 2025 that there was “a risk of an opportunity cost situation here, where something can consume a huge amount of time and actually doesn’t come through”. Now his government has cancelled the national digital ID programme in order to use the savings to fund the government’s priorities on the cost of living. It is evident that LSE’s report stands vindicated. It also vindicates the findings of the report by the India’s Parliamentary Standing Committee on Finance which had cited this report to question and trash India’s unique identification Authority of India Bill, 2010. Is there a connection between the date of delayed announcement of cancellation of UK’s National ID scheme by the Labour Party government and the date of entry into force of the digital trade agreement between India and UK? Wasn’t one of the predecessors of Burnham connected with the first family of Infosys Ltd  the visiting temples to get the agreement signed? Nandan Nilekani, the first chairman of UIDAI was appointed on June 25, 2009 while serving as CEO and Managing Director of Infosys Limited. How is it that both ruling parties and opposition parties are fond of him? Are they standing on the same carpet?

At the behest of the beneficial owners of foreign military and financial entities, Purochanas have built a coalition of the collaborators to support digital Lakshagriha as something which was inspired by Gandhi’s talisman to wipe the tears of the poorest of the poor. After an irreality of benign digital initiative was created, world’s tallest opposition leader was taken for a ride by making him and his party adopt an automated method of recognizing a person based on a biological attributes, wherein a sample of the biological attribute of the entire population is taken, processed by a computer and stored in a Central Identities Data Repository (CIDR) for “one-to-many matching” and “one-to-one matching”.

In her book, Dark Money: The Hidden History of the Billionaires Behind the Rise of the Radical Right, Mayer reveals how two tycoons operated behind the scenes for decades to influence politics, policies and laws in the USA. These commercial czars defeated almost all genuine pro-people policies and laws and promoted laws like REAL ID Act to promote biometric identification although it is conclusively established by scientists that it is inherently fallible. The red-and-blue carpet on which Barack Obama stood to take oath as the President of USA after the electoral victory of Democratic Party was custom made in accordance with a government contract, which had been manufactured by Invista, a subsidiary of Koch Industries owned by the two tycoons, the key donors of the Republican Party. Did Obama succeed in doing what his party wished to do while standing on the carpet of the donor of the Republican Party? Can the leader of the oldest party of the leader, his party and his allies succeed without promising to abandon the digital-biometric carpet which has been myopically laid out in India unmindful of its unprecedented lethal consequences for the present and future Indians.   

The stature of the world’s tallest opposition leader will get established and reinforced only if he can pierce through the chakravyuh of digital cave architecture created by tycoons, drawing insights from the simile of cave recorded in Plato’s The Republic else he, his party and his allies will meet the fate of Abhimanyu and will be burnt to ashes in the digital Lakshagriha like the leadership in Iran and  Venezuela.    

Dr. Gopal Krishna 

Also read: India's First Mass Surveillance, Mass Spying Unending Census Case-Part 19 

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 (The author is a practicing advocate and a researcher of philosophy, mass communication and law. His current work is focused on the philosophy of digital totalitarianism and the monetisation of nature. He has appeared before the Supreme Court's Committees, Parliamentary Committees of Europe, Germany and India and UN agencies on the subject of national and international legislations on UID/Aadhaar/NPR, DNA profiling through criminal identification procedures, nuclear damage, consumers, land acquisition, biological diversity, finance, hazardous waste trade, water cycle and corporate crimes since 2001. He is an ex-Fellow, International Research Group on Authoritarianism and Counter Strategies (IRGAC)-University of Potsdam, Germany.)